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Arguments Not Raised: How the Plaintiffs’ Missed 
Opportunity Led to the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in 
June v. Union Carbide Corp. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in June v. Union 
Carbide Corp.1 is an unremarkable one. The court reaches what 
appears to be a reasonable result in interpreting the Price-Anderson 
Act to exclude medical monitoring claims, and the case mirrors the 
reasoning of a sister circuit in doing so. But while the court presents 
its reasoning as a matter of simple statutory interpretation, the 
court’s holding fails to take into account or even mention its own 
reversal of previous Price-Anderson jurisprudence in the Tenth 
Circuit. Thus, the most striking aspect of the opinion is the court’s 
lack of awareness that it is reversing itself. 
Indeed, the plaintiffs failed to stress to the court that a previous 
panel of the Tenth Circuit had decided the issue in Building & 
Construction Department v. Rockwell International Corp.2 Although 
the plaintiffs mentioned Building & Construction Department in 
their brief, they mostly cited it only to establish that the Tenth 
Circuit had previously approved of medical monitoring claims in 
general.3 The plaintiffs failed to emphasize the fact that Building & 
Construction Department had decided the precise issue of whether a 
medical monitoring claim constitutes a claim for “bodily injury” 
under the Price-Anderson Act.4 This oversight may have directly led 
to a decisive swing in favor of denying all such claims under the 
Act—an issue on which there remains a split in the circuits. 
This Note begins with a brief history of medical monitoring 
claims, the Price-Anderson Act, and the relevant jurisprudence in 
those areas. The Note then recaps the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
June. Next, the Note analyzes the June decision and the alternate 
paths that decision could have taken had the court relied on Building 
 
 1. 577 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 2. 7 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 3. Appellant’s Amended Principal Brief at 64, June, 577 F.3d 1234 (No. 07-1532), 
2008 WL 951278, at *64. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 58–62. 
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& Construction Department—as the plaintiffs should have more 
pointedly asked it to do. The Note concludes by noting the potential 
nationwide consequences of the plaintiffs’ failure to rely more heavily 
on Building & Construction Department in presenting their case to 
the court. 
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
This Part of the Note will examine the relevant statutory 
authority and case law informing the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
June. This examination will begin with a brief discussion of the law 
regarding medical monitoring claims followed by a synopsis of the 
relevant provisions of the Price-Anderson Act. The Note will then 
survey the approaches the various circuits have taken in dealing with 
medical monitoring claims brought under the Act. 
A. Medical Monitoring Claims 
Medical monitoring first arose as an independent cause of action 
in the 1980s.5 Philosophically, medical monitoring claims are based 
on the proposition that a person has “an interest in avoiding 
expensive medical evaluations caused by the tortious conduct of 
others.”6 Thus, it is appropriate for the tortfeasor to pay for the 
diagnostic costs of an event carrying with it a risk of injury “that is 
neither inconsequential nor of a kind the community generally 
accepts as part of the wear and tear of daily life.”7  
An early case based the decision to award medical monitoring 
costs to asymptomatic plaintiffs on the following hypothetical: 
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding 
through a red light. Jones lands on his head with some force. 
 
 5. See Herbert L. Zarov et al., A Medical Monitoring Claim for Asymptomatic 
Plaintiffs: Should Illinois Take the Plunge?, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 3 (2009); see 
generally id. at 3–12 (providing a comprehensive history of medical monitoring). This Note 
focuses specifically on medical monitoring causes of action that are recognized in the absence 
of physical symptoms of illness, rather than on those allowed where physical symptoms are also 
present. The latter type of claim appears to be widely accepted and relatively uncontroversial. 
See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 438 (1997) (“The 
parties do not dispute—and we assume—that an exposed plaintiff can recover related 
reasonable medical monitoring costs if and when he develops symptoms.”). 
 6. Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2007) (en banc). 
 7. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
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Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hospital where doctors 
recommend that he undergo a battery of tests to determine 
whether he has suffered any internal head injuries. The tests prove 
negative, but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the 
substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations.8 
The D.C. Circuit, in examining this scenario, stated “that even in the 
absence of physical injury Jones ought to be able to recover the cost 
for the various diagnostic examinations proximately caused by 
Smith’s negligent action.”9 
Courts initially found this sort of reasoning persuasive, and over 
the next several years multiple jurisdictions adopted medical 
monitoring as an independent cause of action.10 Notably, these 
jurisdictions included the Federal District of Colorado, which stated 
“that the Colorado Supreme Court would probably recognize, in an 
appropriate case, a tort claim for medical monitoring.”11  
However, in 1997 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Metro-North 
Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley,12 which altered the face of 
medical monitoring jurisprudence. Metro-North involved a railroad 
pipefitter whose work resulted in near-constant exposure to 
asbestos.13 After attending an asbestos-awareness class and learning 
of the health risks his job posed, he sued the railroad under the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and sought to recover the 
costs of future medical appointments to diagnose him with the 
asbestos-related diseases for which he was at risk.14 The Court held 
that the worker was not entitled to medical monitoring costs under 
FELA since he did not manifest any physical symptoms as a result of 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the 
Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1114–16 (2006). Between 1984 and 1997, ten jurisdictions 
adopted medical monitoring as a cause of action, while only seven rejected it. Id. In contrast, 
between 1998 and 2006, ten jurisdictions rejected medical monitoring and only five adopted it. 
Id. 
 11. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (D. Colo. 1991). Colorado 
state courts have still not addressed the issue. See Appellants’ Amended Principal Brief at 64, 
June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1532), 2008 WL 
951278, at *64. 
 12. 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
 13. Id. at 427. 
 14. Id. 
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his exposure.15 Writing for the seven Justice majority, Justice Breyer 
noted that extending medical monitoring relief “could threaten both 
a flood of less important cases (potentially absorbing resources better 
left available to those more seriously harmed) and the systemic harms 
that can accompany unlimited and unpredictable liability.”16 
Metro-North appears to have marked a turning point in courts’ 
attitudes towards medical monitoring. Since that decision, more 
courts have chosen to reject medical monitoring than before, and 
fewer courts have adopted it.17 Metro-North has frequently been 
relied upon by both state and federal courts that have rejected 
medical monitoring causes of action.18                      
B. The Price-Anderson Act 
The Price-Anderson Act (“the Act”) was originally passed in 
195719 as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which 
opened up nuclear development to civilian industry.20 The purpose 
of the Act was to limit the potential liability of the nuclear-
development industry for “nuclear incidents.”21 Initially, the Act did 
not create a specific federal cause of action but relied on state causes 
of action already existing at the time.22 In addition, the Act as first 
passed provided original federal jurisdiction only over “extraordinary 
nuclear occurrences” and not mere “nuclear incidents,” which meant 
that most nuclear exposure claims ended up being litigated in state 
courts unless diversity jurisdiction applied.23 Since the claims could 
not be easily consolidated, this caused considerable difficulties in 
situations where claims were brought by multiple plaintiffs from 
multiple states against a single defendant.24 
 
 15. Id. at 438–44. 
 16. Id. at 442 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17. Aberson, supra note 10, at 1114–16. 
 18. See, e.g., Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664–67 (W.D. Tex. 
2006); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 5–6, 9 (Miss. 2007); Henry v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 695–96 (Mich. 2005). 
 19. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 20. See Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 3, 68 Stat. 919, 922 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297 (2006)). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 1, 71 Stat. at 576. 
 22. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1503 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 23. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 24. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 477 (1999) (noting that 
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In response to this difficulty, Congress amended the Act in 1988 
to provide, among other things, original federal jurisdiction over 
“nuclear incidents,” a right of removal, and a federal cause of 
action.25 The jurisdictional provisions were codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2210(n)(2), and provide for both original federal jurisdiction and a 
right to remove state actions to federal court, provided that the suit 
at issue is a “public liability action arising out of or resulting from a 
nuclear incident.”26 In creating the federal cause of action, the Act 
states that a “public liability action” is “an action arising under [§ 
2210(n)(2)],” and further specifies that “the substantive rules for 
decision in such action shall be derived from the law of the State in 
which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is 
inconsistent with the provisions of such section.”27 Thus, despite the 
presence of a federal cause of action, Congress appears to have 
intended that state law continue to apply in the majority of cases. 
Under the Act, “public liability” is a catch-all term that 
encompasses “any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a 
nuclear incident.”28 In turn, a “nuclear incident” under the Act is 
“any occurrence” involving radioactive or nuclear materials that 
“caus[es] . . . bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or 
damage to property, or loss of use of property.”29 The Act is 
generally considered to provide the exclusive remedy for nuclear-
radiation claims, although nothing in the language of the Act says so 
explicitly.30 
Taken together, these provisions present three basic questions a 
federal court must decide in considering how to administer a 
particular case. First, the court must determine whether an action 
being brought under the Act (or an action by a party seeking to 
remove into federal court under § 2210(n)(2)) is a “public liability 
action” recognized under the Act.31 If the action is a “public liability 
 
this difficulty was particularly pronounced in the wake of the Three Mile Island incident). 
 25. See Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 11, 102 
Stat. 1066, 1076 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. § 2014(hh). 
 28. Id. § 2014(w). 
 29. Id. § 2014(q) (emphasis added). 
 30. See, e.g., Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1553 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[Plaintiff] 
can sue under the Price-Anderson Act, as amended, or not at all.”). 
 31. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 487–88 (1999) (deciding 
dispute over whether federal district court or tribal court should determine this question and 
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action,” the court then examines the substantive tort law of the state 
in which the action is being brought to see if the state law is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.32 Finally, assuming it is 
not inconsistent with the provisions in § 2014(q), the court must 
decide how to apply the state law.33 Thus, the amended Act provides 
a method for consolidating nuclear incident claims in a single federal 
forum while still applying the relevant state rules to such claims. 
C. Medical Monitoring Under the Price-Anderson Act 
Several courts have considered whether a medical monitoring 
claim may be brought under the Price-Anderson Act. The Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits have addressed the question directly, while courts in 
the Tenth Circuit, prior to June, had done so in dicta. 
1. Circuit court precedent and the circuit split 
 a. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Rainer. Sixth Circuit precedent 
indicates that a medical monitoring claim may proceed under the 
Act, provided the claim is consistent with the underlying substantive 
state law. In Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., the Sixth Circuit 
considered a medical monitoring claim arising in Kentucky and 
brought under the Act.34 Rather than examine for itself whether a 
claim for medical monitoring constituted “bodily injury,” the court 
instead considered whether the “subcellular damage” the plaintiffs 
claimed they had suffered constituted “bodily injury” under 
Kentucky tort law.35 The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ claim 
based on its reading of Kentucky law.36 Under the three-step rubric 
for deciding Price-Anderson cases, the Rainer court was not 
required to consider the first question of whether the plaintiffs’ claim 
fit the definition of a “public liability action,” since the plaintiffs 
effectively conceded this point.37 Furthermore, the court implicitly 
 
remanding to district court for determination). 
 32. See In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing 
emotional distress claim as inconsistent with § 2014(q)). 
 33. See Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 
1993) (applying Colorado law). 
 34. 402 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 35. Id. at 618. 
 36. Id. at 622. 
 37. See id. at 617 (stating that plaintiffs’ failure to argue whether the Act was controlling 
was “essentially a concession by the plaintiffs that the Price–Anderson Act governs their 
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decided the second question in the plaintiffs’ favor, since it did not 
find their claim to be “inconsistent with the provisions” of the Act 
(although it is questionable whether this issue was ever raised before 
the court).38 The Rainer plaintiffs’ claim ultimately failed on the 
third question—the application of Kentucky state law.39 Thus, if 
Kentucky law had recognized a claim for medical monitoring, the 
Rainer plaintiffs would have prevailed. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis 
therefore indicates that a medical monitoring claim is not barred by 
the Act per se. 
 b. Ninth Circuit precedents. In contrast, Ninth Circuit precedent 
states that medical monitoring claims may not be brought under the 
Act under any circumstances.40 In In re Berg Litigation, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of a medical monitoring 
claim.41 The district court had dismissed the claim on the grounds 
that “the Washington Supreme Court had not yet recognized such a 
cause of action for medical monitoring.”42 According to the district 
court, the plaintiffs’ claim had failed for the same reason as the claim 
at issue in Rainer—the application of state law. The Ninth Circuit, 
however, upheld the dismissal on the grounds that a medical 
monitoring claim, like the emotional-distress claims also at issue in 
the case, “do[es] not demonstrate ‘bodily injury, sickness, disease, or 
death . . . or property damage.’”43 Accordingly, the court reasoned, 
“a cause of action for medical monitoring . . . fails to meet the 
jurisdictional requirements of the Price-Anderson Act.”44 
The court’s reference to “jurisdictional requirements” was a nod 
toward § 2210(n)(2), which confers federal question jurisdiction on 
“action[s] arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident.”45 
 
claims”). 
 38. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 43 n.10, June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 
F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1532), 2008 WL 2113581, at *19 (arguing that the 
question was never raised, and that the court’s decision would have been different if it had 
been). 
 39. Rainer, 402 F.3d at 618. 
 40. See Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2008); 
In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Berg 
Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 41. Berg, 293 F.3d at 1132–33. 
 42. Id. at 1132. 
 43. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (2002)). 
 44. Id. at 1133 (emphasis added). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2002), quoted in Berg, 293 F.3d at 1131. 
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Since “nuclear incident” is defined as “any occurrence . . . 
causing . . . bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or loss of or 
damage to property,”46 it follows that “[p]hysical harm to persons or 
property is thus a jurisdictional prerequisite” under the Act.47 
Accordingly, the Berg court held that federal courts lack subject-
matter jurisdiction over medical monitoring claims brought under 
the Act.48 In other words, the Berg court held that a medical 
monitoring claim fails on the first step of the Price-Anderson analysis 
by failing to qualify as a “public liability action.”49 
The decision in Berg naturally led to the question of whether 
medical monitoring claims that would otherwise be brought under 
the Act could potentially be filed in state court. The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation50 dismissed 
that idea and repudiated the jurisdictional language in Berg: 
[W]e used the term “jurisdictional” in the loose sense, perhaps too 
loose . . . . The district court in this case clearly had subject matter 
jurisdiction under the PAA to decide the issue; the district court 
simply did not have the power to grant the relief requested because 
the plaintiffs have not suffered any physical injury.51 
Thus, the court reasoned, the dismissals were warranted based on 
a failure to state a claim under the Act, not a lack of jurisdiction.52 In 
contrast to the holding in Berg, the analysis in Hanford seems to 
implicate the second step of the Price-Anderson analysis; Hanford 
stands for the proposition that a medical monitoring claim, because 
it is not a claim for “bodily injury” or any other category of damage 
listed in the Act, is inconsistent with the Act’s provisions.53 
2. Colorado District Court and Tenth Circuit precedent 
Prior to June, several decisions by both the Tenth Circuit and 
the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado had, in one 
 
 46. Id. § 2014(q). 
 47. Berg, 293 F.3d at 1131. 
 48. Id. at 1133. 
 49. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
 50. 534 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2008). Both Berg and Hanford arise from the same basic set 
of facts. Id. at 995. 
 51. Id. at 1009. 
 52. See id. at 1010. 
 53. See id. at 1009; see also Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“The Act . . . permits recovery for disease—not simply a risk of disease.”). 
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way or another, expressed approval for medical monitoring claims 
under the Price-Anderson Act. For example, in Dodge v. Cotter 
Corp., the Tenth Circuit appeared to allow a medical monitoring 
claim to be brought under the Act without objection, although it 
seems that no analysis as to the propriety of allowing such a claim 
under the Act was ever undertaken.54 In addition, in Brafford v. 
Susquehanna Corp., Colorado’s federal district court, in deciding 
whether to allow a claim for increased risk of cancer to proceed, 
stated that “subcellular damage resulting to plaintiffs because of their 
exposure to the radiation constitutes a present physical injury.”55 
This holding is notable because a claim for increased risk of cancer, 
like a claim for medical monitoring under the Act, requires a 
showing of “a definite, present physical injury.”56 Furthermore, in 
Cook v. Rockwell International Corp., Colorado’s federal district 
court examined a medical monitoring claim brought under the Act 
and concluded that such a claim was permissible (although again, no 
analysis was undertaken regarding whether such claims fell within the 
language of the Act).57  
The Tenth Circuit subsequently expressed its approval of the 
Cook court’s reasoning in Building & Construction Department v. 
Rockwell International Corp., noting that “the concept of medical 
monitoring [was] gaining wide acceptance.”58 However, Building & 
Construction Department went beyond the superficial analysis in 
Cook. Building & Construction Department concerned a medical 
monitoring claim brought by the employees of a Colorado facility 
that manufactured nuclear weapons.59 In that case, the court held 
that a medical monitoring claim constituted a claim for “personal 
injury” under the Colorado workers’ compensation statute.60 In so 
doing, the court noted: 
 
 54. 203 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs brought claims under 
CERCLA also, and the court’s opinion does not make clear which claims were brought under 
CERCLA versus under the Act. See id. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Dodge court 
disallowed emotional-distress claims based on fear of cancer, which bear a strong conceptual 
resemblance to medical monitoring claims. Id. at 1201–02. 
 55. 586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 1984). 
 56. Id. at 17. 
 57. See 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1476–77 (D. Colo. 1991). 
 58. 7 F.3d 1487, 1490 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993).  
 59. Id. at 1490. 
 60. Id. at 1493–94. 
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The Price-Anderson Act grants federal jurisdiction only where there 
is a public liability action regarding a “nuclear incident” defined as 
a nuclear occurrence “causing . . . bodily injury, sickness, disease, 
or death, or loss of or damage to property” as a result of exposure 
to radioactive and other toxic substances. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). 
Were we to find that plaintiffs’ claims do not constitute “personal 
injury,” it would raise questions as to federal jurisdiction.61 
The court eventually held that, because “personal injury” claims 
were preempted by Colorado workers’ compensation law, the 
plaintiffs could not bring their medical monitoring claim under the 
Act.62 
Thus, the Building & Construction Department court made 
three important decisions. First, just as the Ninth Circuit did in Berg, 
the court read the “bodily injury” requirement to implicate the Act’s 
jurisdictional provisions—and, unlike the Berg court, found that 
jurisdiction existed. Second, the court noted the Act’s bodily-injury 
requirement and concluded that a medical monitoring claim would 
meet that requirement. Third, the court applied Colorado state law 
to decide whether the claim was consistent with that law (and 
ultimately found that it was not). The process the court undertook, 
and the results it reached, indicated that a medical monitoring claim 
that was consistent with Colorado law would be valid under the Act. 
III. JUNE V. UNION CARBIDE CORP. 
This Part of the Note will briefly summarize the facts of the June 
case. The Note will then discuss the Tenth Circuit’s holding in the 
case along with the court’s reasoning. 
A. Facts of the Case 
June concerns the now-abandoned mining town of Uravan, 
Colorado.63 Since at least 1914, companies had mined and milled 
uranium, radium, and vanadium in the Uravan area.64 Union Carbide 
purchased the mines in 1928 and began full-scale mining operations 
 
 61. Id. at 1494 n.7. 
 62. Id. at 1493. 
 63. June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 64. Id. The name “Uravan” is a portmanteau of “uranium” and “vanadium.” See 
URAVAN, COLORADO, http://www.uravan.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
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in 1936.65 Because these operations required substantial manpower, 
the company built the town of Uravan to accommodate workers and 
their families.66 Mining operations continued there until 1984.67 
Soon afterward, the Uravan area was designated as a Superfund site, 
and the town’s residents were evacuated.68 
The plaintiffs in June sued Union Carbide and alleged that the 
company had exposed them to hazardous radiation during their time 
in Uravan.69 Plaintiffs initially brought eight causes of action, 
including a “public liability” claim under the Price-Anderson Act, 
and a medical monitoring claim.70 The medical monitoring claim was 
originally brought as a state law claim, but the district court ruled 
that it, along with the other seven claims, was preempted by the Act; 
the court therefore consolidated all the other claims under the 
“public liability” umbrella.71 The defendants then filed two motions 
for summary judgment, one of which argued that the medical 
monitoring claim was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.72 
The district court agreed with the defendants that the provisions 
of the Act barred any medical monitoring claim against them.73 
However, in doing so, the court construed the defendants’ motion 
as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.74 
Accordingly, the dismissal was without prejudice.75 The plaintiffs 
then appealed the district court’s ruling.76 The defendants did not 
cross-appeal.77 
 
 65. June, 577 F.3d at 1237. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. First Amended Complaint at 11–19, June v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04-MK-123 
(MJW) (D. Colo. May 13, 2004). 
 71. June, 577 F.3d at 1237. 
 72. Id. The other motion was a motion to dismiss the claims made by plaintiffs who had 
developed cancer or other diseases. The defendants argued that these plaintiffs had shown 
insufficient evidence of causation. Id. The district court agreed, and the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed. Id. at 1236. 
 73. Id. at 1238. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1248. 
 76. Id. at 1238. 
 77. Id. at 1248 n.8. 
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On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that a 
showing of “subcellular injury” was sufficient to satisfy the “bodily 
injury” requirement of the Act.78 Among other sources, the plaintiffs 
supported their position by citing the Colorado federal district 
court’s decision in Brafford.79 The plaintiffs also argued that the 
judicial interpretation of various industry insurance policies worked 
in their favor.80 Although the plaintiffs cited Building & 
Construction Department in their brief, they did so primarily to show 
that the court had approved the dictum in Cook and did not explain 
the case’s framework in detail.81 For their part, the defendants 
argued that the district court had erroneously construed their 
motion as one for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.82 A dismissal with 
prejudice, they contended, was warranted as per the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Hanford.83  
B. The Court’s Reasoning 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim.84 The court stated that “‘DNA 
damage and cell death,’ which creates only a possibility of clinical 
disease, does not constitute a ‘bodily injury’ under the Price-
Anderson Act.”85 The court reasoned that medical monitoring claims 
are based on the invasion of one’s possessory interest in one’s own 
body and not on any actual injury or harm suffered.86 Furthermore, 
the court reasoned that an interpretation of “bodily injury” that 
encompassed every exposure to harmful radiation would render that 
language superfluous, since every state law claim would also be a 
cognizable claim under the Act.87 In addition, the court 
 
 78. Appellants’ Amended Principal Brief at 60–62, June, 577 F.3d 1234 (No. 07-
1532), 2008 WL 951278, at *27–29. 
 79. Id. at 61 n.28. 
 80. Id. at 60–62. 
 81. See id. at 64; supra text accompanying notes 56–57. 
 82. Brief of Defendant-Appellees at 47 n.12, June, 577 F.3d 1234 (No. 07-1532), 
2008 WL 2113581, at *19. 
 83. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
 84. June, 577 F.3d at 1248. 
 85. Id. at 1249. 
 86. Id. (citing Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2007) 
(en banc)). 
 87. Id. at 1250; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2006) (barring state-law claims 
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distinguished the plaintiffs’ insurance policy related arguments and 
cases, stating that those cases and canons of construction were 
particular to the insurance industry; in particular, they often 
construed the policy language in favor of providing coverage, even if 
a stricter construction would not have done so.88 Finally, following 
Metro-North, the court cited a public policy concern that allowing 
medical monitoring claims under the Act would lead to an unfair 
distribution of scarce funds for plaintiffs.89 
Since the court decided the medical monitoring issue on the 
basis of the language of the Act itself, it did not reach the question of 
whether Colorado law would recognize a medical monitoring 
claim.90 In addition, although the court recognized the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Hanford and noted, with Hanford, that bodily 
injury was not necessarily a jurisdictional requirement, it refused to 
grant the defendants’ request to convert the dismissal to one with 
prejudice, citing their failure to cross-appeal.91 Thus, the court’s 
ultimate holding was that a medical monitoring claim does not fall 
within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Act.92 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The question presented in June was whether a medical 
monitoring claim can be brought under the Price-Anderson Act. By 
barring the claim as being inconsistent with the jurisdictional 
requirements of the Act, the June court effectively adopted the 
approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Berg and later clarified in 
Hanford.93 However, the court’s holding does not take into account 
the fact that the Tenth Circuit had already answered this question in 
Building & Construction Department. The primary reason the court 
failed to account for this precedent is that the June plaintiffs failed to 
apply it at any length to the facts of their case. This Part will discuss 
the potential effects the plaintiffs’ reliance on Building & 
Construction Department could have had, and what June would have 
looked like had the court relied on its prior precedent. 
 
“inconsistent with the provisions” of the Act). 
 88. June, 577 F.3d at 1250–51. 
 89. Id. at 1251–52. 
 90. Id. at 1252 n.12. 
 91. Id. at 1248 n.8. 
 92. Id. at 1248 & n.8. 
 93. See supra Part II.C.1.b. 
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A. Medical Monitoring as “Bodily Injury” 
The most important facet of the holding in Building & 
Construction Department is the way it defines a medical monitoring 
claim as a claim for “personal injury” for purposes of the Colorado 
workers’ compensation statute.94 This may seem odd at first, because 
the fact that such a claim is defined as a “personal injury” claim 
under the state workers’ compensation scheme seems to have little to 
do with the definition of the claim under federal law. After all, the 
opinion in Building & Construction Department was based in part 
on interpretive canons specific to construing a workers’ 
compensation scheme.95 
The question at issue in Building & Construction Department 
was whether an employer could claim immunity from a medical 
monitoring claim brought under the Act based on the exclusivity 
provisions of the Colorado workers’ compensation statute.96 In 
deciding that the employer was indeed immune to the claim, the 
court noted that, in light of the “‘highly remedial and beneficent’”97 
purpose of the statute, “the immunity from common-law suits 
granted to the employer by the [statute] should be broadly 
construed.”98 Under this scheme, any claim for “personal injury” 
constituted a tort claim from which an employer was immune.99 The 
plaintiffs sought to keep their medical monitoring claim from being 
classified as a “personal injury” claim and argued that “such claims 
require neither the present manifestation of physical injury nor any 
ultimate actual physical injury.”100 However, the court disagreed, 
noting that “[medical monitoring] claims arise primarily out of the 
risk of latent manifestation of physical injury from exposure to toxic 
substances and not out of some purely economic or property loss.”101 
 
 94. Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1493–94 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 1492. 
 97.  Id. at 1493 (quoting In re Question Submitted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, 759 P.2d 17, 26 (Colo. 1988), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, 858 F.2d 1479 
(10th Cir. 1988)). 
 98. Id.  
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1494. 
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So far, all of this appears “readily distinguishable” in the same 
manner as several of the June plaintiffs’ arguments, which were based 
on judicial construction of the “bodily injury” language in insurance 
policies.102 However, the court in Building & Construction 
Department expressed its awareness that, absent a finding of “bodily 
injury,” jurisdictional issues could be raised.103 This means that the 
court had impliedly considered, as a threshold matter, the meaning 
of “bodily injury” in § 2014(q) before it ever considered the 
meaning of “personal injury” under the workers’ compensation 
statute. In other words, in order for the court to hear the medical 
monitoring claim at all, it had to first decide that the claim was a 
“bodily injury” claim. This, of course, is exactly the question the June 
court was deciding, and this decision presumably applied to the 
medical monitoring claim even absent the sorts of interpretive 
canons necessary to construe the claim as a “bodily injury” claim 
under the workers’ compensation statute. Thus, Building & 
Construction Department provides evidence that a medical 
monitoring claim is a claim for “bodily injury” under the Act, and it 
does so while avoiding the Rainer problem of having perhaps failed 
to consider the issue.104 
B. Alternative Interpretations of the Act 
The June court presents its holding as primarily a matter of 
statutory interpretation. Specifically, the court claims that 
interpreting “bodily injury” to include subcellular injury would 
nullify a portion of the Act’s language and is therefore 
impermissible.105 However, the interpretation of “bodily injury” is 
less clear than the court claims; specifically, it is unclear whether 
Congress, by restricting the available causes of action under the Act 
to “bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to 
property, or loss of use of property,” intended to foreclose medical 
monitoring claims.106 The court’s argument regarding the 
supposedly superfluous nature of “bodily injury” is obviated if at 
 
 102. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
 103. See supra text accompanying note 61; see also In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 
1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that failure to meet “bodily injury” requirement precludes 
exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction). 
 104.  See supra Part II.C.1.a. 
 105. June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1250 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (2006). 
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least one class of common claims exists that is clearly outside the 
definition. And such a claim does exist in the form of the emotional 
distress claim. If we accept that emotional distress claims are not 
claims for “bodily injury” or any other category listed in the Act (and 
the case law points very definitely toward this interpretation),107 then 
the phrase “bodily injury” does have a purpose—to screen out 
emotional distress claims. 
Furthermore, in the debate over the 1988 amendments to the 
Act, Congress mentioned (and the defendants pointed out in their 
brief)108 a concern that, without limits on the causes of action 
available under the Act, “juries may arbitrarily award overly generous 
compensation to some claimants for damages which show no 
physical manifestations.”109 Although this danger exists to some 
degree in the medical monitoring context, it is limited there by the 
jury’s ultimate need to place a dollar figure on the sorts of 
procedures necessary to successfully monitor a patient’s condition. 
No such limiting factor exists for emotional distress claims. 
So far, none of this has anything to do with Building & 
Construction Department. However, Building & Construction 
Department helps bolster the case for medical monitoring claims by 
solving a problem the June court stumbled into—the potential 
construction of the “bodily injury” requirement as jurisdictional. 
Recall the Ninth Circuit’s difficulties with subject-matter jurisdiction 
and the potential for state law claims—a difficulty that court 
ultimately had to eliminate via its holding, in Hanford, that 
§ 2014(q) specified only elements of the cause of action.110 Recall 
also that this same issue arose in June and could not be solved with a 
Hanford-style fix due to the defendants’ failure to cross-appeal.111 
Building & Construction Department points the way to an 
alternative solution. By construing medical monitoring claims as 
consistent with the provisions of the Act, Building & Construction 
Department avoids the subject-matter jurisdiction issue altogether. 
Under this construction, a medical monitoring claim would be 
 
 107. See, e.g., Berg, 293 F.3d at 1133. 
 108. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 39, June, 577 F.3d 1234 (No. 07-1532), 2008 
WL 2113581, at *17. 
 109. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-104, pt. 2, at 16 (1987)). 
 110. See In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 111. June, 577 F.3d at 1248 n.8. 
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brought under the applicable state law: if that law allowed such 
claims, then they would be allowed under the Act. More importantly 
for jurisdictional purposes, any dismissals would be with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim under the Act. 
Of course, had the June court chosen this course of action it 
would have had to decide the status of medical monitoring claims 
under Colorado law, something it was likely loath to do as a result of 
the clash between its pre-Metro-North precedent and the post-Metro-
North world.112 But the court could still have disavowed its previous 
precedent by pointing to the analysis (and in particular to the policy 
concerns raised) in Metro-North, just as it did in its actual opinion.113 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, it is not possible to tell what the June court would 
have done had the plaintiffs more directly presented it with the 
reasoning in Building & Construction Department. It is very possible 
that the court would have found a way to distinguish its own 
precedent (most likely by claiming that a decision in the workers’ 
compensation context did not control in June), or that it would have 
found the expressions of legislative intent to be so directly on point 
that no case to the contrary would have swayed it. Nevertheless, had 
the plaintiffs relied more directly on Building & Construction 
Department, their odds of success would have increased substantially. 
The consequences of the June decision may be far-reaching 
indeed. Already, the Tenth Circuit has relied on its decision in June 
in barring other claims brought under the Price-Anderson Act.114 
More broadly, June is likely to be a particularly influential opinion, 
since much of the litigation under the Act arises out of either the 
Ninth or Tenth Circuit.115 As other circuits eventually address the 
issue of medical monitoring claims brought under the Act, they are 
likely to see that the two circuits with the most experience in 
 
 112. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 113. See June, 577 F.3d at 1251–52. 
 114. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1140–42 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(relying on June in holding that the presence of radioactive plutonium on plaintiffs’ property 
does not constitute property damage under the Act). 
 115. Since 2001, only three reported cases arising under the Act have been decided at the 
federal appellate level by a court other than the Ninth or Tenth Circuit. See Smith v. Carbide 
& Chems. Corp., 507 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007); Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 
608 (6th Cir. 2005); Sweet v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 208 (Fed. Cl. 2002), enforced, 63 
Fed. Cl. 591 (Fed. Cl. 2005). 
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interpreting the Act are in agreement; accordingly, they will likely 
favor the June approach over the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Rainer, 
which left open the door for medical monitoring claims that were 
consistent with the applicable state law.116 Thus, the failure of the 
plaintiffs to fully apply Building & Construction Department to the 
June case may have foreclosed medical monitoring claims by not only 
the June plaintiffs, but plaintiffs nationwide. 
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